Concerns that (1) growth in developing countries could worsen the US terms of trade and (2) that increased US trade with developing countries will increase US wage inequality both implicitly refl ect the assumption that goods produced in the United States and developing countries are close substitutes and that specialization is incomplete. In this paper we show on the contrary that there are distinctive patterns of international specialization and that developed and developing countries export fundamentally diff erent products, especially those classifi ed as high tech. Judged by export shares, the United States and developing countries specialize in quite diff erent product categories that, for the most part, do not overlap. Moreover, even when exports are classifi ed in the same category, there are large and systematic diff erences in unit values that suggest the products made by developed and developing countries are not very close substitutes-developed country products are far more sophisticated. Th is generalization is already recognized in the literature but it does not hold for all types of products. Export unit values of developed and developing countries of primary commodity-intensive products are typically quite similar. Unit values of standardized (low-tech) manufactured products exported by developed and developing countries are somewhat similar. By contrast, the medium-and high-tech manufactured exports of developed and developing countries diff er greatly. Th is fi nding has important implications. While measures of across product specialization suggest China and other Asian economies have been moving into high-tech exports, the within-product unit value measures indicate they are doing so in the least sophisticated market segments and the gap in unit values between their exports and those of developed countries has not narrowed over time. Th ese fi ndings shed light on the paradoxical fi nding, exemplifi ed by computers and electronics, that US-manufactured imports from developing countries are concentrated in US industries, which employ relatively high shares of skilled American workers. Th ey help explain why America's nonoil terms of trade have improved and suggest that recently declining relative import prices from developing countries may not produced signifi cant wage inequality in the United States. Finally they suggest that inferring competitive trends based on trade balances in products classifi ed as "high tech" or "advanced" can be highly misleading.
INTRODUCTION
Recently, distinguished economists have raised doubts about the size and distribution of America's gains from trade as a result of its increasing trade with developing countries. On the one hand, in an article that attracted considerable attention, Paul Samuelson (2004) used a conventional Ricardian model to show how growth in developing countries such as China could reduce America's gains from trade. His argument is that as a result of productivity growth these countries could move up the technology ladder suffi ciently to provide important competition for US exports. Th is could induce a decline in America's terms of trade and therefore its gains from trade. 1 losses in industries producing communications equipment, offi ce machinery, and computers. By contrast China's share in high-tech exports rose from 8 percent in 1999 to 19 percent in 2005 to make it by far the world's largest exporter of high-technology products. In addition, America's historically strong trade balance in "advanced technology products" shifted from surplus to defi cit in 2002, driven by US trade with developing countries such as China, Mexico, Malaysia, and Indonesia (NSF 2008) .
Other research also appears to provide corroborating evidence. Schott (2008) fi nds that China's export overlap with the OECD is much greater than one would predict given its low wages.
2 Similarly, Rodrik (2006) fi nds that China's exports are associated with a productivity level that is higher than what would be expected given its income.
Despite this apparent support for Samuelson's concern, however, excluding oil, the terms of trade in manufactured goods of the United States, Germany, and Japan have all actually improved since the mid1990s-the period when import growth from the developing countries accelerated. 3 Moreover since US nonagricultural export prices have increased as much as the prices of US manufactured goods imported from industrial countries, the source of the US (nonoil) terms of trade improvement is the declining relative prices of manufactured imports from developing countries.
While the evidence of declining relative prices of manufactured imports from developing countries may give some comfort with regard to Samuelson's concern, it seems to provide support for Krugman's worry about declining prices of unskilled labor-intensive products. But here too there are problems with the straightforward explanation. In apparent contradiction to conventional trade theory, the most disaggregated six-digit North American Industry Classifi cation System (NAICS) data indicate that US manufacturing industries with high shares of manufactured imports from developing countries are actually more skill intensive than the industries with high shares of imports from developed countries Lawrence 2010a, 2010b) . Th e rapid growth in imports of computers and electronics from developing countries exemplifi es this contradiction. Th ree-quarters of US imports in this sector come from developing countries, yet it is the most skill intensive in US manufacturing.
Th ere are numerous possible explanations for this puzzling result. Th e fi rst, favored by Krugman (2008) , is that aggregation bias confl ates imported unskilled labor-intensive components and more skilled labor-intensive fi nished domestic products. Th is therefore disguises the detrimental impact of outsourcing unskilled-labor processes to developing countries on the wages of US workers who are either displaced or engaged in unskilled labor-intensive activities within US industries. 2. See also Kiyota (2008) who compares US, EU, and Chinese exports to Japan.
3. Edwards and Lawrence (2010a) show that even when the trade defi cit is taken into account, the US nonoil terms of trade have improved since the mid-1990s.
4. See also Blinder (2006) on the off shoring of business services that sparked considerable concern about the loss of US services jobs.
Four other hypotheses with diff erent implications for wage inequality than posited by Krugman are also worth considering. Th e fi rst is "factor-intensity-reversals": US imports from developing countries may be produced abroad with unskilled labor-intensive methods, but in the United States fi rms have automated and upgraded and thus use skilled labor-intensive methods to produce the same products. A second possibility is that given the increased global mobility of capital and technology, contrary to the implications of Heckscher-Ohlin theory, developing countries have acquired comparative advantages in some skill-intensive goods. Th is certainly is the impression left by the NSF Science and Commerce data cited above. A third possibility is that because of international supply chains, much of the value in the products deemed as from developing countries is actually produced in developed countries. In particular,
imports that may arrive in the United States from developing countries like China are actually skill intensive because they contain large amounts of skill-intensive components and designs produced in more developed countries (such as Japan or the United States). A fourth possibility, though, is within category specialization: Domestic and imported goods are simply not close substitutes. Developing countries produce less skill-intensive varieties, while the United States and other developed countries produce more skill-intensive varieties. We have moved to a multicone world with more complete specialization than is assumed by conventional theory.
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In this paper we will resolve these paradoxes and distinguish among these explanations. We provide considerable support for the multicone explanation. We will deal with the problem of aggregation bias by using highly disaggregated trade data. Fortunately, these data distinguish very clearly between raw materials, intermediate components, and fi nished products and are therefore not as subject to aggregation bias. Th ey are also reported as values and quantities, (e.g., in dozens or pounds) allowing for rough comparisons of prices diff erentials. Disaggregated data also allow a better understanding of the factors that could explain the fact that US imports from developing countries are concentrated in US industries that are relatively skilled labor intensive. In addition, since the fi rst four explanations all assume that developed and developing country exports (or tasks) are similar (perfect substitutes) we will use disaggregated unit value data to help us distinguish the fi fth explanation-imperfect substitutes-from the others.
One method we will use to determine head-to-head product competition in our eff ort to resolve these questions is to calculate a "similarity index" that captures the degree to which products share the same detailed classifi cation categories. Th is allows us to explore across-product specialization in trade fl ows.
Fortunately we can compile very fi ne-grained measures of similarity because the United States reports trade data in highly disaggregated 6-and 10-digit Harmonized Tariff System (HTS) categories. For example, the 10-digit HTS import category number 6103106030 contains values of "cotton waistcoats imported as parts of suits."
5. Support for this conclusion can be found in Schott 2003.
However, even at the 10-digit HTS level the data still refl ect aggregation of products of diff erent quality. For example, cotton waistcoats are not all created equal. Indeed, some may have much higher quality and diff erent product attributes (e.g., silver versus gold buttons) than others. Th ese diff erences should be refl ected in diff erent prices. Accordingly, we use a second method, ratios of average unit values at the most disaggregated level (typically either 10-or 6-digit HTS level) to distinguish between products even more precisely. Th is measure captures within-product specialization.
Data
To undertake this examination we concentrate on US trade in manufactured goods, dropping refi ned petroleum products from the data. We use the US trade data provided by Feenstra, Romalis, and Schott (2002) and the United States International Trade Commission. Th e data are highly disaggregated. Th ere are about 9,000 export codes and approximately 12,000 import numbers. To exploit the US data we assume that the goods foreigners export to the United States that are captured in US import data are representative of the goods they generally export to the rest of the world. We also assume that the goods the US exports are representative of goods manufactured in the United States.
Results
We will show in this paper that there are distinctive patterns of international specialization that suggest developed and developing countries produce fundamentally diff erent products. Judged by export shares, the US and developing countries specialize in quite diff erent product categories that for the most part do not overlap. Moreover, even when they do overlap and exports are classifi ed in the same category,
there are large and systematic diff erences in unit values that suggest the products made by developed and developing countries are not very close substitutes-developed country products are far more sophisticated.
Th is generalization does not hold for all types of products. We fi nd that export unit values of primary commodity-intensive products are typically quite similar and unit values of standardized manufactured products exported by developed and developing countries are not very diff erent. But the medium-and high-tech manufactured exports of developed and developing countries diff er greatly.
In these product categories export unit values rise with per capita incomes and there is little evidence of substantial convergence over time. Th is suggests that, especially in these products, developed and developing countries are not competing through producing goods that are close substitutes. 6 Measures of across-product specialization suggest China and other Asian economies have been moving into hightech exports, but the within-product measures indicate they are doing so in the least sophisticated market segments.
6. Th e product cycle theory of Vernon (1966) is one way to explain these fi ndings. 
EXPORT OVERLAP
We fi rst explore the overlap between US exports and foreign exports to the United States using the data on commodity shares for . Like Schott (2008 in his analysis of the rising sophistication of Chinese exports to the United States, we measure the overlap in trade fl ows using indices of similarity at various levels of disaggregation. Whereas Schott benchmarks the composition of developing country exports to the United States against OECD exports to the United States, we extend this by also comparing the similarity of US exports and foreign exports to the United States.
Th e similarity index fi rst involves calculating shares of each commodity and then summing the absolute diff erence in these shares. 8 If Xi is the share of commodity i in X and Yi the share of commodity i in country Y then we fi rst calculate the absolute diff erence in the share of each commodity.
i.e., Xi -Yi | 7. Th is result is also consistent with research by Harrigan (2000) showing that US producer prices did not fall substantially as a result of the Asian fi nancial crisis, which lowered the world prices of many labor-intensive goods.
8. An alternative approach developed by Finger and Kreinin (1979) sums the minimum share for each commodity and produces an index in which confusingly 100 implies complete similarity and zero implies no overlap. See also Sun and Ng (2000) .
We then sum these diff erences and divide by two to provide a similarity index SI XY between X and Y, which is equal to 100 when the two series are completely diff erent and equal to zero when they are completely similar.
Consider, for example if there were just two commodities and two countries. If each fully specialized in exporting one of the products, the columns would be (0, 100) and (100, 0) and the index would measure 100 indicating no overlap. If both specialized in the same product, the columns would be (100, 0) and (100, 0) and the index would register zero indicating complete similarity.
One weakness in the measure is that it is sensitive to the level of disaggregation. Th e ordering of export similarity is broadly consistent with GDP per capita with exports from low-income countries displaying the least overlap with OECD exports and aggregate US exports, but exceptions are evident.
11 Surprisingly, Hong Kong's export similarity with the OECD and the United 9. Th e HTS classifi cation has been revised on numerous occasions to refl ect the development of new products. To ensure comparability across time, we convert all the HTS data to a time-consistent code using the concordance map developed by Pierce and Schott (2009 Th e change in similarity over time is also interesting. Th e export similarity of China, India, and Overall, the similarity indices reveal a rising export similarity between many developing countries and the OECD and the United States. Th ese trends are nevertheless not fully supportive of Samuelson's concerns. Th e rising similarity is broadly consistent with improvements in per capita growth in these countries and does not refl ect exceptional increases in competition with US exports in recent years.
Further, developing-country export similarity with the United States continues to be lower than for developed countries. Even developed countries show a fairly high degree of dissimilarity with US exports (typically around 50).
A comparison of cumulative import shares in table 2 corroborates this fi nding. China has been the focus of considerable attention in the debate on the eff ect of emerging economies on US welfare. We have therefore ranked products according to their shares in Chinese exports to the United States in 2006 and then sorted the other trade data by these rankings. Finally we cumulate the shares accounted for at each percentile of Chinese rankings. Table 2 compares China's manufacturing exports to the United States with those of other countries according to these cumulative shares.
Th e data reveal the weak overlap in the export bundles of developing countries with the United
States and other developed countries. Products that accounted for 50 percent of US imports from China in 2006 made up just 8 percent of US imports from high-income OECD countries and 11 percent of US exports. In contrast, these products accounted for 52 percent of US imports from the Association of GDP per capita and export similarity with the OECD. In his simple regressions, China's export similarity to the OECD is greater than what would be predicted on the basis of its income per capita. However, China is no longer found to be an outlier after jointly controlling for size and level of development.
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN-4) category, 37 percent from Vietnam, but less than 10 percent from India and the category for "other developing countries." Interestingly, these products made up 27 (Hong Kong) to 56 (Singapore) percent of US imports from selected high-income Asian economies suggesting
Chinese export growth to the United States may be at the expense of exports from these countries rather than other high-income economies, including the United States.
A similar story is evident if we look at products accounting for 80 
UNIT VALUES
Another indicator of similarity is unit values. If US exports or imports from developed countries are similar to exports from developing countries in quality, composition, and price we would expect them to have similar unit values. In this section we investigate the similarity in unit values across countries using the highly disaggregated data drawn on in the earlier analysis. 12 As we will show, unit values of US imports from developing countries are substantially lower than those of equivalent products imported from high-income OECD countries and products exported by the United States. Further, unlike the export similarity indices that indicate rising across-product similarity in the export bundle of developing countries with aggregate US exports, the unit value analysis fi nds no such convergence. All told, these results convey a picture in which developed and developing countries tend to specialize in exporting diff erent types of products. trade weights for a fi xed period, but this leads to the elimination of all products not exported in all years. Th is potentially eliminates a high proportion of trade from the calculation, if growth occurs through exports of new products rather than increased exports of existing products. Th ere is some evidence for this eff ect. Product market penetration (share of total products exported) by developing countries into the US market rose rapidly from 1990 to 2006. For example, the share of products (at 6-digit HS level) exported by China rose from 53 percent in 1990 to 90 percent in 2006. Th e equivalent share for the ASEAN-4 and India rose from 42 percent and 32 percent in 1990 to 64 percent and 69 percent in 2006, respectively. However, the extensive growth arising from exports of new products accounted for between 5 to 6 percent of overall export growth in these periods, except for India where it accounted for 17 percent of export growth. Th e implication is that the weighted average, using annual export values as weights, does not diff er substantially from those using fi xed weights. Nonetheless, the average Chinese unit value within these products was around a third of the average for the United States. Other top exports from China were also only a fraction of the price of US exports. Th is provides further evidence of a high degree of within-product specialization by developing and developed countries.
PRODUCT COMPOSITION ACCORDING TO LEVEL OF SOPHISTICATION
Th e concern about emerging-economy exports to the United States is not only that they are becoming more similar to US exports in general, but that the rising similarity has been driven by rapid increases in exports in the same "sophisticated" products exported by the United States.
If production and export of sophisticated products stimulates an acceleration in overall growth of the economy and supply of these very products, as is argued by Lall (2000) and Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik (2007) , then the sophistication of the current structure of exports is a foreshadow of competitiveness pressures that are to come.
What is meant by sophistication is often not clear and can cover the use of sophisticated production processes to produce a good or the export of goods that embody sophisticated goods. In all categories there are exceptions (e.g., amongst RB products the synthesis of fuel from coal requires skill-intensive technologies), but in general the skill requirements tend to rise with the degree of technological complexity. Lall (2000) also argues that the potential for productivity-led growth, as opposed to growth through factor accumulation, rises with the degree of technological complexity. He, for example, argues that technology-intensive trade structures off er better prospects for future growth as their products grow faster in trade and have larger spillover eff ects in terms of generating capabilities that can be used in other activities. His argument is therefore similar to that of Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) and Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik (2007) , who use a diff erent measure of sophistication. Chinese growth is converging on the income level associated with its export bundle to the United States, the gap nevertheless remains sizable and suggestive of substantial additional capacity for economic growth.
China is not alone in the exceptional sophistication of its export bundle to the United States. rising sophistication of exports, as measured using trade value data, may obscure a high degree of withinproduct specialization. We therefore reevaluate the apparent rise in sophistication of emerging and newly industrialized country exports to the United States using unit value data.
15. He also argues that China's composition of exports refl ects production-and technology-oriented policies, not comparative advantage. (2003) developed a measure, termed EXPY c of the productivity level associated with country c's export bundle. Th is indicator is an export share-weighted average of commodity level measures of productivity (PRODY i ), which in turn refl ect the weighted average incomes of the countries exporting that commodity. Th erefore, products which account for a high share of exports by high income per capita countries will be characterized by a high PRODY. In a subsequent paper Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik (2007) show that their measure of EXPY is also a good predictor of future growth. We present three diagrams of the weighted average unit value of US imports relative to US exports for manufactured goods over the period [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] . Figure 4 focuses on US imports from China, fi gure 5 focuses on the aggregate import unit values from low-and middle-income countries, while fi gure 6 looks at import unit values from high-income OECD countries. In all cases, relative prices are fi rst calculated at the six-digit HS level and then aggregated according to their technology classifi cation using annual US export values as weights. We are therefore comparing average within-product price diff erences assuming that the structure of trade refl ects that of US exports. Note that we therefore do not account for across-product specialization and these weighted average relative unit value measures therefore underrepresent the overall degree of specialization.
Hausmann and Rodrik
We fi rst look at Chinese and low-and middle-income country import unit values relative to US exports. Th e relative price measures are neatly grouped into two categories. Th e relative price of resourcebased and low-technology products ranges between 0.5 and 1.2 for China and 0.8 and 1.2 for all developing economies. Th is is expected as these products, particularly resource-based products, tend to be relatively undiff erentiated. Product diff erentiation is not a key determinant of the competitiveness of these products.
Th is is contrasted by medium-and high-technology products. Th e unit values of US import from China of these products lies between 15 and 30 percent of the equivalent products exported by the United States. Further, remarkably, there has been no signifi cant movement in these relative prices over the entire 16 years covered in the sample. Looking at the average for all low-and middle-income countries, the level of relative prices is slightly higher than for China alone, but there is also no change in the trend over time.
Contrast these diagrams with fi gure 6 comparing the unit values of high-income OECD imports with aggregate US exports. US imports of medium-and high-technology manufactures from high-income OECD countries are on average 80 percent of the unit value of the equivalent product exported by the United States. Resource-based and low-technology import unit values are 30 to 90 percent higher (and increasing over time for resource-based products) than the equivalent aggregate US export price.
Th ese fi ndings are not a particular outcome of our choice of technology classifi cation or reference price. We replicate these fi ndings if we compare foreign unit values to US import unit values from highincome OECD countries as opposed to aggregate US export prices. Classifying products according to the sophistication measure of Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) leads to the same conclusion. Th e unit values of US imports of low productivity products (PRODY) from low-and middle-income countries (and 
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Such vast and sustained diff erences in US export prices and import prices of medium-and high-technology products from low-and middle-income countries are indicative of a high degree of within-product specialization. Th ese are also the products that accounted for the dramatic rise in the technological intensity of developing-country exports to the United States and the increases in the export similarity indices shown earlier. Th ese results imply that much of the growth and the apparent rise in sophistication of developing-country exports to the United States have been driven by the export of diff erent products to what is currently being exported by the US (and other high-income OECD countries). Th e rise in sophistication of developing-country exports suggested by their rising technology intensity of trade volumes is thus exaggerated.
DISAGGREGATED ANALYSIS
Next we drill down even further. We have assembled six-digit NAICS data for Chinese imports to the United States, high-income OECD imports to the United States, and US exports for 2006. We then rank these according to their share in US imports from China in 2006, and report the top 50 industries, which accounted for about 58 percent of all US-manufactured imports from China. Table 6 Such vast diff erences in prices suggest that China exports very diff erent products than those exported by high-income OECD countries and the United States.
CONCLUSIONS
Samuelson and Krugman raised various concerns about the impact of developing countries on US welfare and wage inequality. In this paper we assess the evidence using highly disaggregated trade data and reasons to question both positions. Th e reason is the high degree of international specialization in trade fl ows that suggests that aside from natural resource-intensive products such as steel, manufactured goods produced and exported by the United States and other developed countries are very diff erent from those exported by developing countries in general and China in particular.
Our fi ndings suggest that great caution is required when using of measures of "advancedtechnology" trade that are routinely produced by the US Department of Commerce in its monthly trade release to track performance. When imports from developing countries are important, the trade balances in particular high-tech products are not likely to capture competitiveness in similar products (or intermediates). Th is is especially the case for information technology products.
Th e large diff erences in prices we fi nd are indicative of a high degree of specialization. US imports from developing countries are not close substitutes for US exports or US imports from OECD countries.
Th is explains both why the US terms of trade have improved as developing countries have expanded their exports and why the wages of unskilled US workers have not experienced the downward pressures 18 that would have been expected if they were still producing goods that were similar to those made by developing countries.
Th e paradoxical fi nding that US imports from developing countries are concentrated in US industries in which skilled rather than unskilled workers have relatively high payroll shares is predominantly the result of intraindustry international specialization along the lines of skill. Th e large and persistent diff erences in the unit values of exports from developed and developing countries in highly disaggregated data are inconsistent with other explanations for the paradox that assumes perfect substitution. Th ese include factor-intensity reversals, aggregation bias, and claims that inputs from developed countries account for much of the value added contained in imports from developing countries. Notes: Overlap using HS (Rev. 1988 (Rev. -1992 Note: Products are classifi ed according to multiple units, even within the NAICS 6-digit classifi cation. The unit corresponding to the largest Chinese trade fl ow is used to select the units for the dollar price per unit. Price levels at the 6-digit NAICS level are constructed by weighting up unit values at the 10-digit level using trade values as weights. For relative prices, the import weighted average (Chinese imports as weights) for each 6-digit category is presented. The relative price presented therefore diff ers slightly from those that can be calculated using the price levels. The denominator (OECD price) used in the relative price calculation is the import weighted average unit value of high-income OECD countries. 5 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 High technology Low technology Medium technology Resource based Notes: Own calculations based on 6-digit HS data. Individual country average calculated using total US exports as weights. Weighted average for region calculated by aggregating the country level average using total bilateral import values as weights. Manufactures classifi ed as primary products in the Lall technology classifi cation are excluded from these diagrams.
